Russia

Among all the analysed Western Balkan countries, Russia has the most effective influence on the local media. As a result of the specificity of the Balkan media scene, which is often ethnically and politically divided, one prevailing trend can be traced across the WB countries: Russia relies on the local media that are supporting and promoting pro-Russian oriented news without the need to inject financial investment heavily.

Over the past year, there has been a lot of attention put to Russian-spread fake news and disinformation campaigns with the Balkan region being no exception. Certainly, the threat of disinformation must be taken seriously, especially in the sensitive post-conflict societies where it has significant potential to exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. However, it is often difficult to trace direct Russian involvement in these activities and in many cases the initiative comes from the local actors rather than being inflicted from outside.

Russia relies greatly on the mainstream media controlled by the local ruling parties especially in Serbia and in Bosnia's Serb-dominated entity of Republika Srpska (RS). Their media keep close ties and use the content provided by Russian media present in the region. With its Balkan branch launched in 2015 in Belgrade, Russian-operated news agency Sputnik has become Russia’s leading media apparatus in the Western Balkans. It produces a lot of free content, and press agencies and media outlets in the Balkans often without verification republish its content in local languages. Thanks to the multi-media services provided to all interested media, Sputnik is able to expand its impact on other media considerably.

Close ties between some Balkan and Russian political elites also play an important role in promoting a positive image of Russia in the local media, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia. The local political actors and interest groups take advantage of anti-Western tendencies and pro-Russian sentiment during election campaigns, or when resolving internal issues. They often promote Russia in contrast to the West, when pursuing their own (political) interest and therefore make Russian influence more effective.

Russia has relied on its political and business links also in its involvement in the election processes by providing rhetorical and media support to certain candidates and parties. Although it has been accused of more direct meddling in the elections, in particular by alleged involvement in the attempted coup before Montenegrin elections in 2016, or more generally by disinformation campaigns and establishing fake accounts on social networks, such claims are hard to verify and in most cases have not been confirmed.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

For such a relatively small country, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a quite large and diverse media scene. In 2014 BiH’s Press Council registered that eight daily newspapers, 189 weekly or monthly newspapers and magazines, 142 radio stations, 43 television stations, and eight news agencies operate in the country. In addition, there are dozens of news and other web portals. Most of these media organisations, aside from the three state broadcasting services (BHRT at the state level, RTVF in the Federation entity and RTRS in Republika Srpska (RS)) and few more media organisations, are in private hands.[1]

Ever since the 1990s conflict, US and EU have invested heavily into overhauling and democratisation of local media organisations, which worked for several years until the deepening political crisis in recent years brought another radicalisation of the local media. As a result, and unlike the rest of the region, there were very few foreign investments into Bosnian media, most of which until today remain owned and controlled by local political or other interest groups/individuals. However, it has not made foreign influences voiceless. Pro-Russian narratives are mostly spread by the local media in RS which often republish content of the Russian media.

“The main Russian state media with significant influence also in BiH is Belgrade-based Sputnik,” reported Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje.[2] Furthermore, “as long as Russia can fully rely on RS’s main public broadcaster RTRS, and as long as most of the other RS media are openly pro-Russian, Russia does not need to waste its finances on opening additional local media organisations," a Western diplomat argues.[3] During the latest visit to Russia in May this year, even Dodik himself complained to media about the lack of presence of Russian media in RS and openly invited Russia to establish electronic media in RS just as Russia did in Serbia.[4]

As for its involvement in the election processes and results in BiH, Russia has in recent years relied on its political links with Dodik to increase and maintain its presence and influence in BiH, as the latest October general elections have confirmed. The Russian involvement mainly focused on its support to Dodik and his party, the Alliance of Independent Social democrats (SNSD), which was clearly showed through regular meetings and diplomatic events between Russian officials and Dodik, who also managed to secure meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin shortly ahead of the last three elections: 2014 and 2018 general and 2016 local elections.[5] Most recently, Dodik met Putin in Sochi on September 28, only a week ahead of the October elections.[6] Furthermore, some local analyst and officials also complained that the recent visit of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, on September 21, was also Russian “brazen interference in the election process in BiH”.[7]

While some media and experts also suggested that Russia was involved in other ways in BiH elections, such as through the creation of a large number accounts on social networks that became active ahead of BiH's elections,[8] there were no independent officials or instances that were able to confirm and verify such claims.

Kosovo

Russia’s toolkit consisting of fake news and a pro-Russian, anti-Western and anti-EU propaganda has taken its toll in Kosovo. Russia’s attempts to subvert Kosovo’s statehood are not only bound to Russian foreign policy but also include soft power mechanisms, i.e. propaganda through media. In recent years, Kosovo has experienced intensive media propaganda and fake news activities by Russian-owned media outlets such as Sputnik and Russia Today. Russian-owned media is produced in the Serbian language (e.g. R Magazin, Nova Srpska Politicka Misao, or Radio and TV Sputnik), with an aim to target the Serbian community living mostly in Northern Kosovo.[9] The purpose behind this form of propaganda is to spread fake news in order to shape public opinion and create a distorted reality of in-country developments that negatively affect the perception of Kosovo among the Serbian and international community.

As in the other Western Balkan countries, Sputnik is leading Russia’s media agency that produces content that is being republished by local media outlets, including those in Kosovo and uses it as a tool to spread Russian propaganda and anti-Western narratives.[10] Enver Robelli, a renowned Kosovar journalist, has warned against the growing trend of citing Sputnik or Kremlin’s television RT, arguing that Kosovo media outlets should apply stricter criteria when selecting sources of information for broadcasting news[11]. Despite this, the Albanian community in Kosovo remains pro-EU and is very much Western-oriented. However, problems arise if the Albanian community falls prey to Russian-backed news, spread via Kosovar newspapers and portals which republish fake news.

The type of propaganda that such Russian-based media outlets spread have the potential to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo. For instance, one story on Sputnik’s Serbian-language website argued that ethnic Serbs in Kosovo should “sleep with one eye open” because of the threat from Albanian extremists. Another article reported on Russian deminers working in Serbia under the headline: “NATO bombs us, Russia clears”.[12] Furthermore, a news article claimed that prior to President Aleksandar Vučić’s visit to Laplje Selo, near Gracanica, six Albanians had been arrested and the Police confiscated weapons and ammunition when, according to Kosovo Police, no such action had ever taken place.[13] It appears that such news mainly seek to inflict fear among the Serbian community and make them feel insecure, in this way preventing them from further involvement and participation in Kosovo’s multiethnic community. Generally, the Serbs face challenges in accessing local media in Kosovo due to language barriers. Therefore, the Serbian community in Kosovo relies on the Serbian media as the primary source of information. This, in turn, provides a new ground for Russian engagement and enables it to influence the media landscape among the Serbs[14], especially when considering that Russia is positively perceived by the majority of the Serbian community.[15] Furthermore, ties between political parties from the Serbian community and the political party United Russia are consistently developing. That was best seen after the last elections held in Kosovo in June 2017, whereby Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, strongly supported the decision of Srpska Lista to enter the Kosovo government.[16]

Kosovo’s institutions have neither enacted policies or taken concrete actions to prevent Russian influence and any subversive challenges Russia poses to Kosovo; nor is there sufficient awareness of Russian interests in the region. Moreover, Kosovo’s government has not been able to create and finance an independent Serbian media in Kosovo, and the influence of Radio Television of Kosovo Serbian channels requires further attention.[17]

Macedonia

Russia has been by far the most present non-Western country concerning media influence and especially election influence in Macedonia, even though there is no favourable terrain for extensive media influence. One vital barrier is language: the study of the Russian language is very rarely offered by primary or high school institutions in Macedonia and classes offered by foreign-language schools or Russian centre are unlikely to offset the absence of Russian in formal education. Thus, Russian media is less likely to get through to a Macedonian audience directly, even though the Russian national television RTR Planeta is offered by most cable TV operators in the country. The language barrier might apply to the influence of the Kremlin-owned RT as well, which does not have Balkan offshoot and is offered only in English-language version.

However, there is one notable exception to the absence of Macedonian-language, pro-Russian content in the Macedonian media space. The web portal Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), which is a spinoff of the Russian pro-government newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta,[18] runs a Macedonian-language version, which, among others, reports news on Macedonian and Russian cultural activities in Macedonia. Other famous Russian media outlets are absent in Macedonia. One notable example is Sputnik, which has been successfully operating in other WB countries. Macedonia also lacks pro-Russian publications being published occasionally as part of bigger newspapers or magazines, as is the case in Serbia.[19]

Russia’s involvement in Macedonian elections is even stronger, although even here the evidence is not always conclusive. The difficulty in demonstrating with certainty that anti-Western and pro-Russian forces in the country are directly linked to the Kremlin is illustrated in Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s rhetoric. In July 2018, two months before Macedonia’s crucial name referendum, he alleged that “[some Russian representatives] are connected with media [and] encourage the young people to protest in front of the Parliament, to attack policemen, that kind of things. It’s very obvious.”[20] Yet, two months later, he exercised restraint and stated that he had “no evidence of Russian influence.”[21]

The most dramatic form of Russian influence over the referendum vote, but also the one that has been the most difficult to link explicitly to the Kremlin, was payment of 300,000 EUR to Macedonian hooligans by a Russian-Greek businessman with links to the Russian government, Ivan Savidis, to stage anti-Zaev protests and cause unrest in the run-up to the  referendum.[22]

Furthermore, Sputnik launched an extensive disinformation campaign before the referendum,[23] which nonetheless had limited success as it was conducted in English. Sputnik and other (pro-) Russian media spreading false information about the name deal between Macedonia and Greece largely used Facebook, as opposed to Twitter, due to the higher usage of this social network among Macedonians.

Aside from the referendum, Russia has been providing support to Macedonia’s non-parliamentary party United Macedonia, whose name bears an uncanny resemblance to the Kremlin’s United Russia. Party leader Janko Bachev, who advocates for Macedonia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, boasted of having undergone training with leading political technologists in Moscow intended to help his party win power in Macedonia.[24]. Another non-parliamentary party, Levica (The Left), which allied itself with United Macedonia in their opposition to the referendum, is less pro-Russian, but certainly pro-Soviet in its romanticisation of the Communist era.[25] Last but not least, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long surpassed standard diplomatic convention in its press releases on Macedonia. After the September referendum,[26] and during Macedonia’s political crisis from 2015 until 2017,[27] the Ministry issued a number of press releases in explicit support of the discredited former ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE, and in explicit opposition to Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

Montenegro

Ever since Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the number of pro-Russian media outlets in Montenegro has been on the rise. The trend continued in the second half of 2015, when the anti-EU and anti-NATO opposition party, the Democratic Front, held protests against that time Đukanović government that favoured both alliances. This did not stop until the general elections in October 2016, which were marked by a coup attempt targeting Đukanović himself. The organizers intended to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO and to bring the pro-Russian Democratic Front into power.[28] This was, at the same time, the best example of direct Russian meddling in the election process in Montenegro.

There exist a plethora of pro-Russian media outlets in Montenegro whose primary goal is to disseminate Moscow’s agenda and pro-Russian sentiments without financial support coming from Russia. It is quite telling that those are largely run by locals, journalists or representatives of pro-Russian organisations, who oppose both NATO membership and EU accession process. Nevertheless, analysts are divided on the issue. Some argue that Russian media is feeding Montenegrin outlets with information through channels like Sputnik that broadcasts in the Serbian language, while others claim that this is a purely local response, reflecting their dissatisfaction with the current political setup.

The pro-Russian media in Montenegro can be divided into three groups: online media, printed media and radio. The state-backed Russian outlets seated in Belgrade with contributors from Podgorica, such as Sputnik agency, NewsFront online and Russia Beyond website, strongly echo in Montenegro and are used as legitimate and objective sources of information that does not match the real role of this media outlet – pro-Russian propaganda. At least five new websites with pro-Russian agendas were launched in Podgorica in 2017[29], the latest being Ujedinjenje (Unification). It joined the newcomers Sedmica (Week), Princip (Principle), Nova Rijec (New Word) and Magazin (Magazine), in addition to the well-established and very popular IN4S. According to the Montenegrin Ministry of Culture, 15 printed media in the Russian language have been registered in Montenegro since 2006. There is also the Russkoye Radio (Russian radio station) that broadcasts in Montenegro. These outlets target not only those who promote the Kremlin political line and support the opposition parties but also the Russian diaspora in the country.

It also needs to be underlined that most of these outlets are active on social media, especially on VKontakte, the Russian version of Facebook, which is used by the majority of Russian citizens. Social media serves as one of the platforms for disseminating state-backed propaganda as the content from Sputnik and Russia Beyond is republished on an almost daily basis by the mainstream Serbian and Montenegrin media.[30]

Besides the strong presence of pro-Russian media, Russian interference in the political life of Montenegro could also be seen throughout the country’s NATO accession, ranging from diplomatic protests to a pro-Russian boycott of ratification for Montenegrin membership in NATO within the Montenegrin parliament. The most visible meddling of Russia was the attempted coup during the last parliamentary elections in 2016, co-orchestrated with the pro-Russian opposition party, the Democratic Front.[31] Đukanović accused Moscow of financing the opposition parties during the election campaign “through its oligarchs and funnelled through secret channels through Serbia and Republika Srpska”.[32] Both Russia and the opposition parties denied any connection with intervening in the election campaign and Montenegro’s anti-NATO campaign. However, the Democratic Front leaders regularly visit Moscow and meet highly positioned people, for instance, the Deputy Secretary of the United Russia General Council Sergei Zheleznyak or the Director General of Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin.[33] This shows that Russia has been effective in influencing the highest political elites in the country as well as making use of media to amplify its role in Montenegro further and to direct the country’s orientation towards the East.

Serbia

Even though the number of internet and social media users is constantly increasing, more than 51 % of citizens older than 15 years are computer illiterate. Therefore, TV and newspapers still play a major role in shaping the Serbian public, Media in Serbia is under the control of ruling political parties, and the majority lack transparent ownership structure.[34] The space for independent media is shrinking, and only government and pro-government media have national coverage.

Serbian public remains uniformly positive towards Russia. The image of Russia is largely in line with pro-Kremlin media[35] but also with Serbian pro-regime press. Russia also asserts its influence on Serbian citizens through its soft power tools – by broadcasting media outlets in Serbian. Additionally, there are many successful media platforms - RT, Russia Beyond The Headlines, the website Russia Word or Russian Gazette (Rossiyskaya Gazeta). A 2015 agreement on cultural co-operation between the Belgrade cultural centre “The Russian House” and the Youth Association of Serbia and the establishment of Russian media, as a result, reinforces Russia’s influence in the cultural sphere.[36] The Russian media skilfully amplify anti-Western narratives already present in the local media.[37] The US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee's Report[38] states that Russian propaganda has an impact on the public’s opinion. Since Sputnik’s launch in 2015, Russia’s popularity among Serbs has increased from 47.8  % to 60 % in June 2017.

Thanks to domestic political and intellectual elite, and other interests groups the image of Slavic brotherhood between Serbs and Russians is dominating media coverage of Russia in Serbia, but also in the West. The West nurtures the image of Serbs as “little Russians” due to their shared ethnic and religious heritage, which is, however, a simplified and often misleading black and white picture. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Serbia and Russia are not natural allies and friends. Putin is portrayed in the mainstream media as a great supporter of Serbia against Kosovo’s independence. However, Russia’s interest lay somewhere else since “over the past years, as the US and the EU are failing to succeed in resolving a lasting solution to the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo, Russia has changed the role of a prominent Belgrade supporter aside trying to assume the role of a mediator.”[39]

While the official Serbian FP is pro-European, the analysis of pro-government media shows quite the opposite. Serbian politicians glorifying Putin and promoting Russia’s image as a counterweight to the West when pursuing their own interests makes Russian influence more effective. Politicians are overblowing the significance of Russian assistance and capitalise on anti-Western and pro-Russian sentiment ahead of the elections or when resolving internal issues.

Politicians also interfere in editing media in order to influence the content related to Russia. “The most drastic example of how Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić interferes with the editing of television diaries is that, at the request of his cabinet, every one of his talks with Putin in Moscow is titled, not synchronised. In this way, he wants to show how well he has learned the Russian language. His speech in the Russian language is broadcast on RTS, Pink, Prva TV and O2,” says anonymous RTS reporter.[40]

Serbian pro-regime press,[41] not only voluntarily disseminate news from Russia’s portals, but also periodically spreads fake news. Stevan Dojčinović, editor-in-chief of the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK),[42] said that Serbian mainstream media is a bigger danger than Russian outlets. “The majority of fake news comes from the mainstream media and the government. Yes, there is some coming from Russia, but they are second-rate fake news people,” he said.[43] For example, Serbian daily newspaper Večernje Novosti recently wrote how Vučić would receive the highest Russian decoration – Alexander Nevski. Putin’s cabinet denied this and Vučić changed his statement mentioning how it would be an honour for him to receive it.

Moreover, Serbian tabloids are inventing stories about shipping of weapons from Russia.[44] The disinformation of the public is contributed by the limited access to information and because the Ministry of Defence is keeping information from journalists and the public. This depicts a need to create an image of Russia’s strong military presence in Serbia and the support it receives, which the West generally considers to be evidence of active Russian propaganda in the country.

Last but not the least, aside from strong pro-Russian advocacy by the Serbian media, Russia also cherishes from having support from the highest political elite – the President Aleksandar Vučić. A former extreme nationalist who has rebranded himself as a pro-EU reformer, Vučić claims that he wants to lead the country into the EU while also pushing for deeper ties with a longtime ally Russia. During the campaign for presidential elections in 2017, Vučić met both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin while securing the support of the latter. Putin himself said that Vučić is known in Russia as a strong supporter of strengthening friendly relations between the countries, thus fostering mutual relations.